Payment for Environmental Services (PES) is a globally expanding concept used to address environmental degradation. PES advocates argue that conservation of ecosystems can and should be enhanced by voluntary transactions among environmental service providers and buyers. PES policy and intervention instruments, however, are not neutral development tools entering cultural and sociopolitical voids. Apart from being manufactured by scientific, policy, and development networks with particular market-environmentalist visions, values, and interests, PES also deeply interacts with the contradictions and unequal power structures of those local societies where the policy tool is introduced. This paper shows how comprehending the historic and current struggles over natural resources among stakeholders who provide and demand "environmental services" is fundamental to understanding PES workings and outcomes. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in the Chamachán watershed, Northern Ecuadorian Highlands, we analyze the dynamics and entwining of "visible," "hidden" and "invisible" power mechanisms in shaping PES and natural resource control. Our findings show how power asymmetries among stakeholders pervaded negotiations and agreements. The paper highlights the political character of market-based conservation efforts and the power plays that surround PES interventions.
Introduction
P ayment for Environmental Services (PES) is a recurrent concept and prominent policy tool in many conservation strategies around the world (Bennett, Carroll, and Hamilton 2012) . PES is based on the principle that those who benefit from "environmental services" (e.g., users of clean water) or those responsible for assuring their provision (e.g., governments) should pay for them, while those who contribute to generating these services (such as upstream land users) should be compensated for providing them (Engel, Pagiola, 1 strategies to conservation (Pagiola, Arcenas, and Platais 2005) . Its recurrence in state policies and development intervention discourse is explained by its appeal to generating environmental protection while simultaneously reducing poverty (Pagiola 2007) . PES' appeal is also built upon its relative autonomy from bureaucratic administration and public spending, fitting neatly into the principles and claims of dominant (neo-)liberal policy approaches (Büscher 2012; McAfee and Shapiro 2010) . This pricing of nature's resources and services, assigning and reassigning property rights to them, and trading these goods and services as commodities (Liverman 2004 ) is then positioned as the ideal way to make resource use efficient and reduce environmental degradation (Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010) .
The fierce promotion of PES rationality and project implementation is counteracted by substantial case research and examination of its policy discourse. Based on theoretical bodies that critically scrutinize the basic foundations and postulates of neoliberalism (Baud 2007; Foucault 2008; Harvey 2003; Klein 2007 ) and processes of neoliberalizing nature (Bakker 2010; Bauer 1998; Budds 2009; Büscher 2012; Fletcher 2010; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Zoomers 2002) , these studies review empirical evidence on PES implementation and its implications for environmental communities (Isch and Gentes 2006; Robertson 2004; Rodriguez de Francisco, Budds, and Boelens 2013) . Many of these studies unravel phenomena whereby the blossoming of green markets is related to the transfer of conservation costs to the poor and benefits to the powerful (Martínez-Alier 2002; McAfee 1999) . Commonly, this is linked to the occurrence of "green grabbing" (Vidal 2008) whereby green credentials are wielded to justify seizing community land and water resources (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones 2012; Goldman 2001) .
While PES schemes are implemented at the watershed scale or in local forests, design and negotiation occur at multi-scalar levels; for instance, connecting local service providers with private, government, and non-governmental actors operating at national/global levels (Rosa et al. 2003) . The heterogeneity of the actors involved in the negotiations, in terms of economic, political, and cultural backgrounds, triggers a dynamic power play in PES implementation processes (Rodriguez de Francisco, Budds, and Boelens 2013) . Several studies have analyzed power structures and tactics in relation to conservation projects (Milne and Adams 2012) . Some have focused on the exclusionary results of conservation projects, creating protected areas from which local people are evicted (Igoe and Brockington 2007; Isch and Gentes 2006) . Others have examined the inclusionary politics and discursive practices of conservation schemes, integrating local producers into market-based natural resource governance dominated by non-local decision makers (Boelens, Hoogesteger, and Rodriguez de Francisco 2014.; Granda 2005; Osborne 2013 ). These analyses have contributed to understanding how power dynamics are not just "external" to communities and their power-heterogeneous members, but profoundly intervene in and subtly entwine within community realities (West 2006; Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014) . Several of these case studies feature environmental conflict and power imbalances among agents involved in PES, from global to local levels; they manifest problematic impacts by PES on environmental communities. The studies done so far highlight that in order to better foresee and comprehend possible PES socioeconomic impacts, it is necessary to examine the historical struggles over natural resources control and the power dynamics that underlay the interaction among environmental services buyers and sellers in PES implementation contexts.
In this paper, we use the power cube of Gaventa (2006) as a framework for analyzing how power dynamics played out around a PES project in the Chamachán watershed in the northern Andean highlands of Ecuador. This project aims to conserve the ecosystems inhabited mostly by indigenous communities and provide drinking and irrigation water to several water users in the municipality of Pimampiro. The PES scheme was proposed and financed by municipal and provincial governments and by foreign aid support.
Our findings explain how historical struggles over natural resources crystallized in PES decision making arenas as "visible," "invisible," and "hidden" power; partly solving a longstanding natural resource dispute-to the benefit of the most powerful and wealthy. Most local community members "providing environmental services" to Pimampiro feel that PES is not an equitable agreement. Payments do not represent fair economic compensation, restrict upstream smallholders' livelihoods, and, just as important, the implemented PES arrangements obstruct the upstream communities' historical demand to access irrigation water-precisely the resource they are helping to conserve. In this sense, PES does not help to solve conflicts regarding access to and control of natural resources and instead strengthens the position of the most powerful agents who already have access to irrigation water downstream.
In this paper, we first briefly outline the power analytical framework that we use to examine the Chamachán watershed PES project in Ecuador. Thereafter, we introduce the methods used to gather and analyze information on the case study. Next, we present a historical description of the natural resource conflict in order to understand the context in which PES was introduced. Subsequently, we examine the power-laden implementation process of the scheme. Finally, we discuss our findings and present concluding remarks.
Multiple Forms, Spaces, and Levels of Power:
Conceptual Notes
Notwithstanding the fact that most conservation interventions portray themselves as neutral and politically-void, framing their choices as technical, scientific, and rational, or even "natural," they are necessarily just as political as any other natural resource management and development intermediation (Büscher 2010; Vos and Boelens 2014) . By placing distribution and management of natural resources exclusively in the realm of nature, natural resource management strategies and policies are naturalized and the policy debate becomes depoliticized and decontextualized-largely devoid of considerations regarding power relations, politics, and culture (Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014) . Ecological distribution issues or the social, spatial, and temporal asymmetries in access to and control over natural resources and environmental burdens are intrinsically mediated by power asymmetries (Martínez-Alier 1995 , 2002 2 . In general terms, power is a relational means inducing the capacity or potentiality to make or to receive change, or to resist it (adapted from Foucault 1980 Foucault , 1995 Lukes 2005a ). According to Lukes (2005b) , power is defined in three different forms. The first, visible power, focuses on how conflict between interests is dealt with in public spaces, through observable decision making, as revealed in the political arena by the formal rules, institutions, and authorities that are mobilized by political actor groups. Here, power consists of "openly" mobilizing the means to defeat opponents' preferences (Gaventa 2006; Lorenzi 2006) , for example, by bringing economic and political resources such as votes, jobs, influence, etc., to the bargaining game and strategically positioning these resources through, among others, personal efficacy, political experience, and organizational strength (Gaventa 1980 ). Lukes' second form of power relates to the strategic ability to set the agenda and define which actors and topics will be gathered around the negotiation table. Concealed ways of setting the rules of the game, including the "mobilization of bias" (Bachrach and Baratz 1970) , are fundamental here to defining who is included and excluded (Gaventa 2006) . This is called hidden power and is deployed by vested interests to maintain their power and privilege by creating barriers to participation, by excluding key issues from the public arena, or by controlling politics "backstage." They may occur not only within political processes but in organizational and other group contexts as well, such as workplaces, NGOs, or community-based organizations (IDS 2010) .
Here, power involves "decision making in political arenas but also non-decisions: decisions that result in suppressing or thwarting challenges to the values or interests of the decision maker" (Bachrach and Baratz 1970:43-44) . This may undermine protests and claims for change or leave them unexpressed. Examples include the threat of sanctions (from intimidation to co-optation) or the invocation of an existing bias of the political system (e.g., precedents, rules, or procedures) to remove a threatening demand. This may include manipulative use of meaning and symbols, such as calling opponents "backward," "troublemakers," or "terrorists" (Gaventa 1980) . Other processes of non-decision making may include "decision-less decisions," a process originating from institutional inaction, and the "rule of anticipation" where less powerful actors decide not to make a demand anticipating further reprisals from the powerful actor (Gaventa 1980) . The third power form, invisible power, relates to normalizing power as in Foucault's (1991 Foucault's ( , 1995 capillary power, where the internalization of morals, social norms, and ethical standards creates subjects that exercise control over themselves and each other. This power is not exercised centrally by the powerful but involves the less powerful "by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial" (Lukes 2005b:28) . While normalizing power is often "subject-less," not belonging to any particular actor, but interweaving both dominant and subordinated together in a normalizing web that deepens and reinforces the status quo (Foucault 1995) , it may also take "agent-centered" forms. Hereby, dominant groups shape or influence the beliefs and desires of others, securing their compliance (Lukes 2005a) , or in foucauldian terms, they engage in governmentality projects by organizing different technologies of power to "conduct the conduct" of the dominated (Foucault 1991) .
Government-rationality produces new forms of knowledge and concepts that "contribute to the 'government' of new domains of regulation and intervention"; for example, ecosystems and the boundaries between nature and society are rearranged so that "previously untapped areas are being opened in the interests of capitalization and chances for commercial exploitation" (Lemke 2001:8) .
In addition, Gaventa (2006) argues that Lukes' three forms of power may be understood in relation to how spaces of engagement are created and the levels at which these forms of power operate (e.g., from local to global). To visualize these appearances of power, he links them in the power cube ( Figure 1 ). Consequently, forms, spaces, and levels of power can be understood as separate but interrelated dimensions.
Levels of power can be defined in various manners, e.g., global/national/local. Spaces, which are political arenas, are seen as "opportunities, moments, and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions, and relationships that affect their lives and interests" (Gaventa 2006:26) . Such spaces of participation are not "out there" but socially constructed, their contents and boundaries influenced by power relations (Gaventa 2005) . Spaces can be categorized as follows: (1) closed spaces, where boundaries of participation are (intended to be) fixed and decisions are made by groups of actors behind closed doors (Gaventa 2006) ; (2) invited spaces "into which people (as users, citizens, or beneficiaries) are invited to participate by various kinds of authorities, be they government, supranational agencies, or non-governmental organizations" (Gaventa 2006:26) ; and finally, (3) "spaces which are claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power holders, or created autonomously by them" (Gaventa 2006:27) . These spaces are shaped through the diverse outcomes of people's mobilizations, federations, and other meeting opportunities for shared action (Boelens and Seemann 2014; Hoogesteger 2012) .
Forms, levels, and spaces of power dynamically interact with and affect each other. Both dominant and subordinated groups often aim to connect different levels of action, work simultaneously through (or open/close) various spaces to foster their interests, and combine diverse forms of power. Their ability to do so shapes the arenas, contents, and (fluctuating) outcomes of power struggles in practice. 
A Power Analysis of the Chamachán Watershed Project: Methods
This case study is set up as ethnographic research with the communities involved in the Chamachán watershed PES, in Mariano Acosta County, Pimampiro, Ecuador. Fieldwork was carried out throughout the year 2010.
Semi-structured interviews and participatory observation were the principal data collection methods, including in total 34 individual interviews. We interviewed 11 of the 18 participating private owners in Chamachán watershed, one Municipality professional, one Proderena (NGO) professional, one Irrigation Board professional, two political leaders from Mariano Acosta, and two professionals of Agronomes et Vétérinaires sans Frontiers (AVSF-CICDA) and two members of Mariano Acosta Indigenous and Peasants Union (UCICMA). Moreover, 10 members of the Guagalá Association (environmental service providers but not participating in PES) were interviewed during participation in eight community working days. Next, we also interviewed four nonparticipating members of the Puetaqui and Mariano Acosta villages. All interviews were done in Spanish, and most were recorded and transcribed. Quotes in this article are translations by the authors, prioritizing the more nuanced and illustrative quotes. Interviews were also complemented with two focus group meetings with the members of the Guagalá association.
Figure 2. Pimampiro Municipality and its Watersheds (Adapted from Avellaneda and Villafuerte 2008)
During our research, we specifically focused on analyzing decision making concerning the PES project: in what ways were decisions taken (forms of power), who were involved and in what types of arenas (spaces of power), and at which levels were decisions made? The power spaces analysis focused specifically on closed and open spaces to understand top-down dynamics and on claimed spaces to understand bottom-up dynamics. With respect to levels of power, we took into consideration how PES stems from global-level policies and discourses while being implemented at national and local levels. Additionally, we analyzed the intersections of forms, spaces, and levels of power by identifying how people are affected by the decisions taken.
Regarding information analysis, all interview data were categorized according to the decision making features of PES. We analyzed the frequency of common answers and contradictions among them, aiming also to scrutinize differences in responses. We tested the validity of our results by presenting them in a feedback workshop organized with the Chamachán watershed and neighboring communities, NGO members (AVSF-CICDA), and the Imbabura indigenous federation. Feedback was also organized with PES implementing institutes, in two separate meetings with the Proderena NGO and Pimampiro municipality.
The Case: Chamachán Watershed Environmental Services Compensation Project Resource Struggles in the Area
Pimampiro has a total population of 6,300 urban and 11,000 rural inhabitants, distributed over its territory of 44,200 hectares. The municipality of Pimampiro is divided in four watersheds: Escudillas, Blanco, Pisque, and Chamachán (Avellaneda and Villafuerte 2008) (see Figure 2) . The Chamachán watershed is located between 1,700 and 3,700 meters above sea level (Guerrero 2010) , with an area of 2,310 hectares, divided into 645 hectares of páramos (highland pastures), and 1,665 of primary and secondary forests. This watershed is located in the Mariano Acosta Township. This large township (13,400 hectares) has a population of 1,900 (60% self-defined as indigenous Karanki, the rest as mestizos), whose principal livelihood is agriculture (GMP 2010) .
The indigenous communities now inhabiting Mariano Acosta arrived in 1905 from the neighboring townships of Angochagua and La Rinconada. They moved there in search of land that enabled them to escape their status as huasipungueros (semi-serfs) in the neighboring haciendas. When they arrived, this land (owned and controlled by Santa Rosa Hacienda) was not being used. Indigenous acquisition cost lengthy struggles in the highlands and a profound court dispute with the hacienda owner. In 1926, the court ruled in favor of the communities. This decision to entitle the land in Mariano Acosta to indigenous families marked the area's agricultural reactivation. (Spanish conquerors had expelled the Chapi indigenous community four centuries earlier [Theisen and Costales 1969] .) However, the court's decision regarded land only, as water remained under hacienda control. To this respect, the landlord ruled the Pimampiro Canal, originally constructed by the Chapi in the 16th Century (Mothes 1987) to bring water from the Mariano Acosta highlands to the lowlands in the vicinity of Pimampiro's main urban center.
In the 1950s, Pimampiro's most important haciendas (Santa Rosa and Pinandro), which by that time only valued the highlands for their wood resources, were sold or divided (Restrepo 1958) . The people who inherited or bought them changed from traditional hacienda farming to a more commercial orientation, which marked the formation of Pimampiro's Irrigation Board and a more intense use of water downstream (Preston 1990 ). These changes in land tenure and hydraulic infrastructure downstream triggered a race for water titling (Dulong 2005) . The Pimampiro municipality tried to monopolize most highlands water sources in order to provide drinking water for downstream consumption and for intensive agricultural production in the lowlands. This race for water coincided with rain shortages in Mariano Acosta, triggering a series of claims from both indigenous and mestizo families who requested the redistribution of and access to the irrigation water that was concentrated in Pimampiro hands (CESA 1998).
In 1980, Pimampiro was officially recognized as a municipality, and despite heavy resistance by the people of Mariano Acosta, Mariano was annexed to the new municipality (CESA 1998). Soon thereafter, Pimampiro acquired via CNRH (National Water Resources Board) three water concessions in Puetaqui and several others in the upper part of Chamachán watershed, without prior consent from the communities upstream. Now with political control over Mariano Acosta, in 1990, Pimampiro started building the Nueva América Canal, to transfer water from the Pisque River to the Pimampiro Canal. The idea was to use this new concession from the Pisque River to supply 24-hour drinking water in Pimampiro. However, it was soon detected that the Pisque's water was not suitable for human consumption (EMAPA-P professional, personal communication, June 2010) . So in order to supply Pimampiro with suitable drinking water, the municipal water company swapped its concession in the Pisque River for the one that the Irrigation Board had on the Chamachán watershed (Dauriac 2005) (Figure 3) . This also coincided with the implementation of the first PES scheme in the area (the Nueva América PES), the forerunner and twin project of the Chamachán watershed PES (Wunder and Alban 2008) . This project was implemented in Mariano Acosta between 2001 and 2002 to improve water supply to Pimampiro by paying PES participants in Nueva América a compensation of up to one dollar per hectare per month for protecting woodlands and páramos along the Palaurco River (Wunder and Alban 2008) . Ironically, because of the swap in concessions, Pimampiro residents pay Nueva America upstream farmers for environmental services; the farmers must conserve their forests for this purpose, but the water conserved does not go to Pimampiro drinking water users but to the fields of the members of the Pimampiro Irrigation Board. At the same time, drinking water in Pimampiro originates in another, hydrologically separate watershed, Chamachán. Service providers here, however, are not paid by Pimampiro drinking water users (who "use the environmental services") because the latter "are already paying Nueva América for the services." (Pimampiro municipal professional, personal communication, July 2010) In sum, the backdrop of these modern/modernist project interventions is shaped by a long history of struggles for land and water in the area. In most conflicts, water has been a key resource flowing toward the powerful. In Pimampiro, political and economic power shifted from hacienda owners to the mestizo middle class. By contrast, peasant/indigenous peoples have been impoverished (Preston 1990 ). In Pimampiro nowadays, the highlands are home to families engaged in subsistence farming, while agrarian entrepreneurs at lower elevations practice commercial agriculture (CESA 1998; cf. Martínez-Alier 2002; Perreault 2005) . These days, both are combined as (unequal) "partners" and entwined in the "neoliberalization of nature," triggered in Pimampiro, among other factors, by market mechanisms established to conserve water.
The Chamachán Watershed PES
The PES scheme in Chamachán watershed is organized in the following way. The users of environmental services are the water utility of Pimampiro urban center and the members of the Pimampiro Irrigation Board. The providers of environmental services are some private landowners and the communal landholders in the upper part of the Chamachán watershed. The scheme's implementers established that only landowners can receive payments.
Landowners who receive payments for environmental services are those who have signed a contract for conservation. This is the case for 18 private landowners with a total of 303 hectares of forests. These owners get paid a maximum of one dollar per hectare per month. 3 The payment is an economic incentive to conserve the upstream ecosystems that regulate water quantity and quality, and therefore the PES scheme pays landowners in the upper Chamachán watershed for not converting forest lands and paramo areas into agricultural land. Payments are calculated according to the following classification: $6 per hectare per year for "disturbed forest or páramo"; $8 per hectare per year for "mature secondary forest"; and $12 per hectare per year for "primary forest or páramo" (Wunder and Alban 2008) . Simultaneously, people in the upper part of the Chamachán watershed are subject to the provisions of Ecuador's Forestry Law (Law 74, 1981) , which prohibits the conversion of watershed vegetation (forest, bushes, páramo) into farmland and the extraction of timber for commercial purposes. The PES in the Chamachán watershed operates on top of the provisions of the Forestry Law. PES, thus, strengthens the Forestry Law and its ability to penalize transgressors, which stands in stark contrast with its limited reinforcement in the past (Wunder and Alban 2008) . This law requires that farmers apply for a permit (with the Ministry of Environment) when they want to clear vegetation on their own land (up to a maximum of 20%). Penalties for non-compliance with the entwined application of the PES and Forestry Law regulations include: suspension of payments (temporal or indefinitely), cancellation of payments or participation in the scheme, fines, and jail imprisonment. Enforcement and control is carried out by communal forest rangers and rare inspection visits by municipality representatives.
One of the main problems these farmers face is that areas of land that are left fallow-as is common practice in their land regeneration systems where fields are cultivated rotationally-are classified by the municipality as land under natural regeneration. Because of this reclassification, this land then becomes subject to the Forestry Law and PES clearance restrictions (see also Rodriguez de Francisco, Budds, and Boelens 2013) .
Besides these private landowners, a second group that is affected by the PES scheme consists of several non-participating peasant families in the upper part of the Chamachán watershed. This is a group of 16 owners who have control over 497 hectares 4 adjacent to Guagalá Creek (see Figure 3 ). This group is organized in the Guagalá Association. This collective, formed 30 years ago by a group of indigenous peasant families from Puetaqui, has no formal land titles and therefore was excluded from participating in PES.
5 Land is communal property, whereby each member has an individual plot that is worked individually by each family and by mingas (collective labor parties) and through mutual support exchanges among association members.
The implementers and intermediaries of this PES scheme are the Municipality of Pimampiro and the Proderena NGO program. However, there is an important feature that makes this PES a publicly funded scheme: the money paid to the participating environmental service providers comes from start-up capital provided by the European Union via the Proderena program, the Province of Imbabura, and Birdlife Ecuador, among others. This is because the drinking water users of the Pimampiro water utility already pay an extra fee to conserve the Nueva America ecosystems (Rodriguez de Francisco, Budds, and Boelens 2013; Wunder and Alban 2008) . As a consequence, in order to guarantee this project's economic sustainability, it would be necessary to charge, in their turn, the water users of the Irrigation Board for watershed services (Guerrero 2010) . This, however, has not yet happened.
Power Plays in the Chamachán
Watershed PES
Visible Power
During our fieldwork, all respondents-both participants and those not participating in PES-agreed on the need to conserve the area and on the importance of this for them and for Pimampiro. As one of the farmer leaders explained characteristically, referring to the land as a place for livelihood generation and as a cultural space in which they are rooted and to which their ancestors belong, "if it were not for us and our ancestors, nowadays, there wouldn't be a single tree standing in these mountains…conservation for us peasants has been also a way of working with the land." Conservation, for most of the Chamachán watershed peasant families, goes beyond just economic incentives and values and PES marketization rules.
They are also critical of other components of the PES scheme. Regarding resource distribution, half of the participating and all non-participating members mentioned that they consider that most water is concentrated for Pimampiro's use; they feel this is unfair, as they cannot use the water for irrigation when the dry season is longer than expected. Furthermore, several participating members questioned PES conservation in terms of enforcement by the threat of legal force, making them decide to join the scheme. As one PES participant said, "Environmental law is making it difficult to earn a livelihood by working the land and, since we need everything that we can get, we decided to join PES." Another participant similarly stated, "Nowadays, it is forbidden to be a farmer in these mountains, and even if we don't want to be conservation rentcollectors, we need to at least get this income."
Regarding PES payments, all participating members stated that they disagreed with the PES rates and would like to see them increased. As one farmer mentioned, "With the payment that I receive, I can only buy two Coca-Colas a month, and I deserve more than that." Also, non-participants mentioned that, although they are scared of possible penalties for working the land and nearby forest areas, they cannot afford not to work them because otherwise they wouldn't be able to provide food and income for their families. One of the small-holders said that "…Pimampiro has already stolen our water, and now, with laws and miserly payments for conservation, they want to control the land and forest that we used to simply use."
For the above reasons and despite much criticism by even the PES participants, in December 2007, the contracts for conservation were finally approved and signed. One element that certainly played an important role was the increased force of law that accompanied PES introduction. One socialization meeting (July 2007) featured a presentation about the Nueva America PES by one of its beneficiaries, explaining not only the benefits but also the duties and punishments of PES. In another public discussion meeting (September 2007), the environmental laws (i.e., responsibilities, duties, fines) for high-altitude Andean forest were explained in great detail by a professional from the Ministry of Environment. During this meeting, for example, it was explained that the project will have, as in Nueva America, forest rangers hired by the projects to better patrol and more strictly control people's forest activities in the area. A Proderena professional (personal communication, July 2010) explained that during this process "it became very clear how environmental service suppliers were not aware of any or had very little knowledge about environmental laws; but this deficiency was corrected during the public discussion process, creating environmental awareness and understanding of the implications of deforestation and of not following environmental law." In this same interview, she mentioned that "the public meetings were very intense; it was not easy to change peasants' mental concepts, since the project's potential beneficiaries often think that the objective of external interventions is to seize their mountains and pastures. This has always been their fear; with this innovative project, we are offering them solutions, making sure that they won't clear forests or extend their cropland areas, so this actually helps them" (Idem).
During our interviews, one additional powerful argument for participating in PES was brought forward. While travelling up and down the catchment while making their living, villagers had often faced problems with the dirt road from Mariano Acosta to the upper part of the Chamachán watershed. Two months before the meeting took place in which the contracts were signed, the Municipality made continued road building conditional upon high participation of landowners in PES, or else construction would stop. The municipality defended their PES power play by stating, "There is a clear relationship between construction of transport infrastructure and the danger of deforestation. We, as the Municipality, have to provide such infrastructure but, by ensuring PES participation, we also ensure conservation" (Pimampiro municipal professional, personal communication, August 2010) .
Hidden Power
Apart from the more open use of pressure and power arguments to enforce PES in the area, not all the elements of the conservation project were openly communicated, and some clearly belonged to a more hidden agenda. For example, during implementation, the municipality decided to issue a municipal decree to turn the land controlled by the Guagalá Association into a "municipal natural reserve for water catchment and regulation." But when interviewing members of the Guagalá Association, it became clear that they were not officially notified about the on-going initiative to transform the status of their land; turning it into a municipal reserve would entail great dangers for them in terms of (PES) land use restrictions or even expropriation. Learning about this initiative by coincidence, their response was to work their land even more intensively and to rebuild the old shelter close to Guagalá Creek (see Figure 3) , in order to show productive use of these lands. When this was discussed with a municipal professional, the latter responded, "This association is illegally occupying this land. Because of their status as illegal squatters, they should not be even considered for PES as they are now; they should not be rewarded" (Pimampiro municipal professional, personal communication, August 2010) . Discussing this issue openly at the PES negotiation table was out of the question, however. The municipality knew that questioning the land titles of these smallholders outright would trigger large resistance and decided to turn to a hidden strategy.
Similar hidden power modes were observed in other occasions. For instance, as Guerrero (2010) explains, during a public meeting organized in October 2007, upstream farmers firmly argued for an item on the meeting's agenda to discuss how the PES project could be adapted to their local reality. They suggested increasing PES rates to account for loss of income in the area, redistributing the water saved by their conservation practices and implementing productive alternatives. The project implementers promised to take these interests into consideration and see what could be done to implement them. Later, it appeared that nothing was done with these suggestions. According to the Municipality, this was because "it would be inequitable to increase PES rates for some and not for the rest or to change any other conditions that are already established in the neighboring PES system. We only want to give compensation and not pay the entire opportunity cost per hectare. Conservation of Pimampiro's water sources and biodiversity is the end and the means that enable us to bring welfare to the communities" (municipality professional, personal communication, August 2010) . Regarding water redistribution, the Municipality and Proderena argued, "It is beyond our scope to change anything regarding existing water concessions" (Proderena professional, personal communication, July 2010). As for upstream farmers' demand of support for alternative production opportunities, they mentioned that the PES scheme had its own, established components and that adding production diversification projects to it was not included in the design. It was only after years, after installing the PES project, that these hidden arguments surfaced and that these rightful claims were never taken seriously because making this manifest from the outset would have opened room for large protests.
Invisible Power
Besides the visible power efforts to explain and impose law and land use restrictions to Chamachán watershed farmers, many of the events and actions were not at all driven by a focus to forbid and exclude. Quite to the contrary, they were guided by a deep belief in helping farmers to progress. As a Proderena professional (with a peasant-family origin) explained, conservation is nowadays more about offering (economic) options rather than posing land use limitations on peasants. She explained how these newly created economic options can help modernize peasant agriculture: "They [the peasants of Mariano] always talk about their potatoes and other mellocos (tubers), but you don't see significant land use in these environmentally important areas" (Proderena professional, personal communication, July 2010) . She also explained how "PES makes them [peasants] realize other, more important values of nature" (Idem).
Clearly, this invisible power in PES relates not only to its implementers but equally to the way in which peasants accept or embrace the new label of environmental service providers. As one of them explained, "Now we have realized that it is important to conserve and to set a good example, and therefore, we receive conservation payments and work elsewhere" (Chamachán watershed PES participant, May 2010) .
As Sullivan (2009) explains, the modernizing, global impetus of market conservation that searches to restructure rural landscapes has characterized local peasants (its cultural and social relationships), such as those in Mariano Acosta, as backward, poor, marginal, and environmentally problematic. For peasants, the only option is to refrain from their backward environmentally-faulty livelihoods and start selling nature in order to save it (McAfee 1999). Many of these newly labeled "local environmental providers" understand and enact their new role by "self-correcting" behavior, in order to become an example of modern, market-based conservation farmers for the rest of their communities. This also matches the views of PES implementing agents who are part of the same normalizing web. Their view of rural landscapes 6 is driven by their interest to adopt new, modernistic, market-based conservation strategies that mirror Western science. This simultaneously makes their projects eligible for future funds from the global North by modernizing locals and helping conservation.
And indeed, according to the Municipality of Pimampiro, the success of the neighboring PES scheme in Nueva America in terms of progress towards modern natural resources control made them want to replicate this experience to secure "the hydrological importance of its highland forest and páramos" (municipal professional, personal communication, May 2010) . The fact that the Nueva America experience received strong international, national, and regional support and attention made it useful to recommend other projects. Proderena prepared the program, and it was soon approved for European Union funding. The subsequent preparation and public discussion processes in the area took two years, and the Chamachán watershed PES project was implemented under the same conditions as those of the Nueva America PES scheme. Guerrero (2010) explains the process and contents of these discussion meetings, to which communities of Mariano Acosta were invited from 2006 onwards. These meetings explained the functioning of this modern approach to conservation, the experiences of the Nueva America PES, and PES contracts and implications to the people in Mariano Acosta. Since it dealt with a new conservation discourse and intervention concept, with new incentives and moral concepts, project implementers realized that much effort was needed to discursively introduce the new rationality at the initial project stages. Farmers were framed and approached in training sessions as individualistically rationalizing utility-maximizers who strategically calculate costs and benefits to further their personal interests. The PES project was there to generate the right economic incentive structures. Trainers and project professionals showed deep faith in their PES postulates and strategy and worked to include local families in their modern way of thinking, explaining the need in terms of progress, development, and the assumption that whenever the incentives are right, private motives of profit maximization will automatically make water conservation and use as efficient as possible.
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Conclusion
The global market-environmentalism discourse calls for more "room" to conserve areas important for environmental service provision by implementing PES, to deal with subsistence farmers who would threaten these areas (World Bank 2005), while intensifying modern agriculture elsewhere (Didde 2012) . This discourse highlights the need to secure sufficient food for a growing population and sustained economic progress. As part of their discourse, PES instruments are increasingly exported to developing countries as well as to local societies in which livelihood and production relationships are largely based on noncommodified exchange.
This process of trickling down global ideas into local projects entails social interaction teamed with power dynamics among international organizations, national governments, local NGOs, and land managers. Thereby, PES schemes are generally presented as economic instruments where peasants can choose to participate voluntarily. In addition, PES rationality and instruments are portrayed as generating the necessary incentives (the carrot) to materialize their own, universal interests while simultaneously following environmental legislation (the stick). This paper highlights that what is presented as a tasty, imported carrot might also prove to be an imported stick. As we have shown, it is through normalizing, invisible power that the stick is actually presented and perceived as a carrot. At the same time, whenever some peasants do not want to take the carrot offered to them, as they prefer to grow their own food and take care of nature in their own way, the carrot is just pushed on them by using visible and hidden power.
Generally, these visible, hidden, and invisible forms of power combine in PES implementation. The Chamachán watershed case shows how PES entwines with and strengthens top-down command-and-control instruments, which are often already in place but not always enforced by environmental authorities. In anticipation of possible future punishments, potential participants choose to participate "voluntarily" in the PES schemes, even though they did not agree with the conditions attached. Power wielded in decision making fiercely pushes potential environmental providers to accept PES, rather than involving them voluntarily, or giving them a real option to reject it. Openly expressed visible power plays-as the threat to stop building the road that was wished for by the upstreamers-alternate with hidden power games-as the threat to designate Guagalá Association territory as a Pimampiro-controlled PES nature reserve area. Threats and realities of "green grabbing" or modern forms of "enclosing the commons" profoundly and strategically entwine the three modes of power.
This strategic entwining of different power modes in the Chamachán watershed case sustain the presentation of PES as a politically-neutral conservation and development tool, while in fact it has deep political dimensions. These politics of PES refer not only to the process of project design and implementation but equally to how they tend to obliterate, silence, or simplify complex, historically rooted struggles over natural resource control. Disregarding the political dimensions of PES and natural resource management is likely to end up favoring the interests of the most powerful in those localities where PES is implemented.
Notes
